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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

Case No. 971018-CA

:
Priority No. 2

PHILIP E. HOLLEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction on one count of aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1994), and one count of
aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302
(1998). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not moving to suppress
eyewitness identification testimony?
2. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in advising defendant regarding
his right to testify at trial?
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3. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not requesting a jury
instruction on a lesser included offense of unlawful restraint?
"Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of law and
fact." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994) {citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). The trial court conducted a hearing and made
findings of fact with regard to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. "In ruling on an ineffective
assistance claim following a Rule 23B hearing, 'we defer to the trial court's findings of
fact, but review its legal conclusions for correctness.'" State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d
285, 289 (Utah App. 1998) {quoting State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah App.
1997)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (1995)

(aggravated kidnaping)
(unlawful restraint)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of aggravated robbery, aggravated
kidnaping, and aggravated assault (R.6). The trial court dismissed the aggravated
assault charge (R.24), and a jury convicted defendant on the aggravated robbery and
aggravated kidnaping charges (R. 19-20). The trial court sentenced defendant to two
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concurrent prison terms of five years to life (R.18), and defendant timely appealed
(R.28).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the evening and early morning of June 24 and 25, 1995, defendant and his codefendant Jeffrey Mecham robbed the Cinemark Movie 10 theater in Lay ton, Utah.
During the final movie showings of the night, defendant and Mecham gathered the
theater employees at gunpoint and took them up to the manager's office. They forced
the manager to remove the cash from the safe and bound the employees' hands and feet
with packing tape before they left.
The theater employees were initially shown a photograph array containing the
photograph of Michael Cantue, who was then a suspect. Although several employees
picked Cantue's photograph out as resembling one of the robbers (R. 106-110), none of
the employees identified Cantue as the robber in a live lineup (R. 112-113). The police
later showed the employees another photograph array containing a photograph of
another suspect, Dennis Dougherty, but none of the employees identified anyone out of
that array (R. 115-116).
Defendant and Mecham were later identified by the police as possible suspects,
and two separate photograph arrays were prepared (R. 116). The photograph arrays
were presented to the witnesses as two piles of loose photographs, and the witnesses
were allowed to shuffle through them and lay them out on a table in random order.
3
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The photograph arrays were shown to five of the employees,1 all of whom identified
defendant as one of the men who robbed the theater (R. 118-123). These same five
theater employees likewise identified defendant at trial:
Heidi Maroney. Heidi was working in the concession stand at the theater that
evening, and during the final movie showings was cleaning the concession area along
with Kristin Rogers and Megan Brimhall (R. 173). Defendant came into the kitchen
area with a gun, and Heidi looked at him for two or three seconds before defendant told
her to turn around (R. 177, 180). Defendant had a gauze bandage covering part of his
face (R.178). Heidi remembered having seen him when he had come into the theater
an hour before, and had wondered what was wrong with his face (R. 179-80). Heidi
had at that time discussed defendant's appearance with Megan, and had watched him
cross the lobby, for five to ten seconds (R.180).
Defendant took Heidi, Kristin, and Megan upstairs to the manager's office at
gunpoint (R. 182-84). Defendant forced Heidi and the others to kneel on the floor of
the manager's office, and bound them with packing tape while the robbery was
completed (R.186).

1

There were two other employees working that night who were unavailable as
witnesses: Kristin Rogers and Steve Nearing were both out of state at the time of the
trial (R. 107, 109).
4
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When Heidi was shown the first photograph array, she identified Cantue as
"very similar" to the robber she had seen, but did not think it was him (R.189, 192).
She then saw the live lineup with Cantue, and did not identify him or anyone else
(R. 189-90). Heidi was later shown the second photograph array with Dougherty, but
she did not recognize any of the photographs (R. 190). The police then showed her a
third photograph array with defendant's photograph, and Heidi identified defendant as
the robber with the gauze patch (R. 191). Heidi also identified defendant at trial
(R.191).
Megan Brimhall. Megan was cleaning the concession area during the final
movie showings of the evening (R.196). At some point, she went back to the kitchen
area where Heidi and Kristin were working (R.201). Defendant was there holding a
gun, and he told Megan to look down (R.202). Before turning away from him, Megan
looked at him for four to five seconds in a brightly lit area (R.202, 205). She saw the
gauze patch on his face and remembered having seen him earlier when he had come
into the theater. At that time, Megan had noticed the gauze and commented on it to
Heidi. Megan had watched defendant for a minute or two as he walked through the
lobby (R.203-04).
When shown the photograph array that included Cantue's photograph, Megan
thought that Cantue resembled the gunman, causing her to jump back (R.213).
However, when she saw Cantue in person during a lineup, she knew that he was not the
5
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man who robbed the theater (R.214). Megan was shown the Dougherty photograph
array, and did not identify anyone (R.214). When she was shown the two photograph
arrays with photographs of defendant and Mecham, she had no trouble identifying both
defendant and Mecham as the robbers (R.215). Megan also identified defendant and
Mecham at trial (R.211,212).
Mark Mudrow. As the theater assistant manager, Mark was upstairs in the
theater office with Nicole George during the final movie showing of the night, counting
the box office receipts of the day (R. 151). Nicole answered a knock at the door; the
three concessions workers-Heidi, Kristin, and Megan-came in, followed by defendant,
who was holding a gun (R. 152). Mark recalled having seen defendant earlier in the
evening when defendant had entered the theater, taking note of him because of the
gauze patch on his face (R. 154). Defendant ordered Mark to open the safe, and they
briefly discussed its contents (R. 155). Although defendant told him to look away,
Mark looked at defendant repeatedly, for a combined total of about thirty seconds
(R. 156-57). As assistant manager, Mark had been trained to comply with any requests
by a robber, but to look carefully in order to get a description and be able to identify
them. Mark therefore paid attention to defendant's appearance (R. 158). The office
was well lit and small; Mark was generally only about six or seven feet away from
defendant (R. 157, 163).
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The police showed Mark the photograph array with Cantue's photograph, and
Mark felt that some faces looked familiar, but did not identify anyone as the robber
(R. 166). Mark was also shown the live lineup with Cantue, but did not identify anyone
(R.166). Mark was shown the Dougherty photograph array, but did not identify
anyone (R. 116). When he was shown the photograph arrays with defendant and
Mecham, Mark identified defendant as the robber with the gauze on his face (R.167).
Mark also identified defendant at trial (R.167).
Nicole George. Nicole was upstairs in the theater office counting the money
with Mark Mudrow when defendant brought the three concession workers upstairs at
gunpoint (R.246). Nicole watched from about five or six feet away as defendant
entered the office with a gun (R.247). As an assistant manager, Nicole had also been
trained to cooperate during a robbery, but to get a description of the robbers (R.249).
Nicole knew that she would be asked to describe the robbers and concentrated on being
able to do that (R.255). While defendant was standing near Mark, forcing him to open
the safe, Nicole stared at defendant for close to a minute, until defendant turned and
saw her looking at him, and she then looked away (R.249). After he gathered the cash
from the office, defendant ordered Nicole to go with him and open the downstairs door
to the lobby (R.250). When Nicole opened the door, the second robber was standing
there with his gun (R.251). He appeared startled to see Nicole and he pressed his gun
against Nicole's forehead (R.251). He then pulled his turtleneck collar up over his
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nose, but Nicole saw his face for five or six seconds (R.252). Nicole was then taken
back up to the office (R.252).
When shown the first photograph array, Nicole identified the photograph of
Cantue as being similar to defendant, but stated that it was not him (R.109, 256). She
was also shown the live lineup with Cantue, but did not identify anyone as the robber
(R.256). Nicole was shown the Dougherty photograph array, but she did not see
anyone familiar (R.257). When she was shown the two photograph arrays with
defendant and Mecham, Nicole identified both as the robbers (R.258). Nicole also
identified defendant and Mecham at trial (R.259,260)
Nathan Nance. Nathan was a projectionist and usher at the theater (R.220).
During the final movie showings of the evening, Nathan was with Steve Nearing, an
usher (R.222). At one point, Nathan went to the restroom, and when he returned, he
saw that no one was working in the concession stand, and could not find any of the
other employees (R.223). After looking around, Nathan called out for Steve (R.225).
Mecham leaned over an upstairs railing, pointed a gun at Nathan, and walked down the
stairs (R.225). Mecham then took Nathan upstairs at gunpoint (R.227). Steve was
already upstairs, and Mecham took both Nathan and Steve to the office, where they
were bound with packing tape along with the other employees (R.228).
Nathan did not see defendant during the robbery, but remembered seeing
defendant come into the theater with the gauze patch on his face (R.233). Nathan did
8
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not recognize anyone out of the Cantue photograph array (R. 109, 230). Nathan
likewise did not identify anyone out of the Dougherty photograph array (R. 116). When
he was shown the two photograph arrays with defendant's and Mecham's photographs,
however, Nathan identified both defendant and Mecham as the robbers (R. 122-23, 23132). Nathan also identified defendant and Mecham at trial (R.234).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. Trial counsel's decision not to file a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence of the eyewitnesses' identification of defendant from the photograph array was
a reasonable tactical decision and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Counsel's decision was based upon a full investigation of the facts, including examining
the photographs used, questioning the police regarding the procedures used for the
photograph identification, and interviewing the witnesses regarding the strength and
consistency of their identifications of defendant. Counsel correctly concluded that there
was little likelihood of suppressing the identifications, and felt that filing the motion
would have entailed significant risks, including the danger of further reinforcing the
eyewitnesses' testimony.
Defendant has also failed to show that a motion to suppress the identifications
would have been successful, as the witnesses all had ample opportunity to observe
defendant during the robbery, and the procedures used in conducting the photograph
identification were not in any way suggestive.
9
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Point II. Counsel's advice to defendant not to testify at trial did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel because that advice was correctly based upon a
balancing of the pros and cons of such testimony. Counsel had reasonably concluded
that his client was actually guilty of the crime, and defendant had not offered any
explanation or defense which could be presented to the jury by way of his testimony,
indicating that defendant would not make an effective witness. Further, defendant
would also have been subject to damaging cross-examination which outweighed any
possible advantages of having defendant testify, especially since defendant's testimony
would have offered nothing more than a bald denial of guilt. Also, in light of the
strong eyewitness testimony, defendant's testimony would not have altered the result of
the trial, and thus defendant has failed to show any prejudice arising out of counsel's
advice.
Point III. Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a
jury instruction on the crime of unlawful restraint as a lesser included offense to
aggravated kidnaping. Although unlawful restraint and aggravated kidnaping share
common elements, under the facts of this case, the "restraint" of the victims was
undisputably committed in the course of a robbery, and there is no rational theory for
acquitting defendant of aggravated kidnaping and yet convicting him of unlawful
restraint. In addition, counsel's decision not to ask for a lesser included instruction was
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a tactically correct decision, since the theory of the defense was that defendant was
misidentified, not that he did not intend to commit a robbery.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN
DECIDING NOT TO FILE A PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EYEWITNESSES' IDENTIFICATIONS, AS COUNSEL HAD
STRONG STRATEGIC REASONS FOR NOT FILING A MOTION,
AND THERE WAS NO REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF
SUPPRESSING THE STRONG WITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in not filing a pretrial
motion to suppress the eyewitness identifications, as allowed under State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Brief of Appellant, pp. 23-24.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show
(1) that trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient; and (2) that there exists a
reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, he would have obtained a more
favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). However, defendant has failed to
show that his trial counsel's carefully considered decision not to file a Ramirez motion
was deficient, or that such a motion would, in fact, have been successful in suppressing
the eyewitness testimony which formed the basis for defendant's conviction.

11
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A. Defendant's trial counsel fully considered the advantages and
disadvantages of filing a Ramirez motion.
In considering a claim that counsel was deficient, this Court will give trial
counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions
unless there is no reasonable basis for them. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644 {citing Taylor v.
Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah
App. 1998) ("we must be persuaded that there was a 'lack of any conceivable tactical
basis for counsel's actions'") {quoting State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah
App. 1989)).
Defendant argues that counsel should have made a motion to suppress the
eyewitness identifications, apparently based upon the assumption that simply because
Ramirez provides that such a motion may be made, it should always be made. See
Brief of Appellant, p. 25 (trial counsel "should request and thus require the trial court
to make a preliminary determination as to the constitutional reliability of the eyewitness
identification."). However, there are disadvantages to filing a Ramirez motion which
must be weighed carefully against the likelihood of obtaining a favorable result.
Defendant fails to consider such reasons for not filing a Ramirez motion, and simply
asserts that "the record does not reveal any reasonable tactic that would mitigate or
ameliorate the deficiency." Brief of Appellant, p. 29. To the contrary, defendant's
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counsel testified at length at the Rule 23B hearing regarding the tactical reasons for his
decision not to file the motion.
First, counsel testified that he carefully evaluated the likelihood of prevailing on
the motion, and concluded that the motion would be futile (R.521:24). He talked to the
police detective about his procedures for conducting the photograph identification,
examined the photographs, and hired an investigator to interview the witnesses
regarding the basis and strength of their identifications (R.521:23). Based upon this
investigation, he concluded that the identification procedure was not unfairly suggestive
(R.521:22-24).
Second, counsel testified that a Ramirez hearing would likely have harmed
defendant's case at trial. The trial court's Rule 23B findings state that "[defendant's
counsel] felt that the filing of such a motion would only have the effect of educating the
prosecution more about his theory of defense and give already strong identification
witnesses yet another chance to rehearse their testimony and further solidify their
identification of Mr. Hollen." Finding of Fact # 32 (R.515). See also Transcript of
Rule 23B Hearing, p. 41 (R.521:41) ("I wanted the prosecutor to spend as little time as
possible on this case, hoping he would be less prepared for trial.").
The record shows that defendant's trial counsel fully considered the possible
advantages and disadvantages of filing a Ramirez motion, and made a reasonable
tactical decision not to do so. "Since 'conceivable tactical bases' for defense counsel's
13
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actions are apparent and have some support in the record, and defendant has not
overcome the 'strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance,' we must assume defense counsel acted
competently." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 543-44 {quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578,
579 (Utah App. 1993)).
B. A motion to suppress the eyewitness identifications would not have
been successful.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant has the burden of
showing not only that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance, but also that
"counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50
(Utah 1998). Counsel's failure to bring a motion that would have been futile does not
constitute ineffective assistance. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah
1994). A motion to suppress the eyewitness identification testimony based upon
Ramirez would have been futile because the factors cited in Ramirez as relevant to the
issue all indicate that the eyewitness identifications in this case were reliable.
Ramirez lists the following factors to consider in ruling on a motion to suppress
an eyewitness identification:
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2)
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3)
the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical
and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and
14
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the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 {quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). These five factors
generally fall into two categories: the ability of a witness to accurately identify a
perpetrator, and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure used. The witness
identifications in this case would not have been subject to suppression under Ramirez,
as all five of the eyewitnesses had an adequate, and in some cases ideal, opportunity to
observe defendant at the time of the robbery, and because the photograph identification
procedure was not in any way suggestive.
1. Opportunity and capacity to observe. Defendant asserts that that the
witnesses had a "limited opportunity" to view him during the robbery, but supports this
assertion only with fragmented, out-of-context quotes from the trial record, without
attempting to consider the actual experience of any particular witness in looking at
defendant on the night of the robbery. Brief of Appellant, pp. 25-26. For example,
defendant misleadingly cites to fragments of Heidi Maroney's testimony ("pretty dark .
. . not well lit" and "Facing the wall the entire time") which do not refer at all to the
times and places when Heidi was looking at defendant's face. See Brief of Appellant,
p. 26. In fact, Heidi testified that she saw defendant's face for several seconds in the
well-lit kitchen, and remembered watching him walk across the lobby earlier, taking
sufficient note of defendant to discuss his appearance with Megan Brimhall (R. 178-79).
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Consequently, defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that a Ramirez
motion would, in fact, have been successful. Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50.
Contrary to defendant's unsupported characterization of the witnesses'
opportunity to observe defendant, all the witnesses testified that they saw defendant's
face for periods of time ranging from several seconds to minutes, generally up close
and in brightly lit rooms. See R. 177-180 (Heidi Maroney); R.202-205 (Megan
Brimhall); R. 156-58, 163 (Mark Mudrow); R.233 (Nathan Nance); R.249 (Nicole
George). Although several of the witnesses acknowledged that they were afraid, there
was no indication that their fear had any negative effect on their perceptions, and two
of the witnesses emphasized that they were concentrating on being able to describe and
identify the robbers, as they had been trained to do (R.158, 249, 255). Indeed,
defendant's trial counsel fully investigated the witnesses' ability to identify defendant,
and "felt that there was high level of certainty with regard to their identification." Rule
23B Hearing Transcript, p. 40 (R.521:40). See generally Id., pp. 36-40 (counsel's
analysis of the Ramirez factors as applied to these witnesses).2

2

Even if defendant had made a showing that some particular witness's
identification was weaker than others, and could have been suppressed, there are valid
tactical reasons for not filing a motion to suppress a weak identification when there are
multiple identifications. See Commonwealth v. Levia, 431 N.E.2d 928, 933 (Mass.
1982) (noting tactical decision not to suppress weaker identifications in order to seek
spillover effect on the strong identifications from impeachment on cross examination of
the weaker identifications).
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This evidence contrasts with the eyewitness identification ruled admissible in
Ramirez, where the witness identified a robber who was masked, crouched down in a
shadowy area, and viewed from up to thirty feet away. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. See
also State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 220, 224 (Utah 1995) (finding eyewitness's "few
seconds" observation of defendant "sufficiently reliable" to be admitted.).
2. Non-suggestiveness of the photograph identification procedure.
Defendant does not make any argument regarding the suggestiveness of the photograph
identification procedure, which is one of the factors to be considered under Ramirez.
See State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n. 1 (Utah App. 1992) (refusing to consider
suggestiveness claim in absence of sufficient analysis or citation to authority).
In fact, as defendant's trial counsel recognized, the procedures used for the
photograph identification were not suggestive in any way (R.521:23-24). The
photographs were given separately to each witness in a stack, and the witnesses were
allowed to shuffle through them or lay them out in any order. This approach prevented
the officer conducting the photograph identification procedure from in some way
suggesting or emphasizing one photograph. Id. Defendant's counsel also examined the
photographs used in the array, and did not find that the photographs themselves
rendered the identification unfair (R.521:26-30). See R.475 (photo array of defendant).
This procedure is to be contrasted to the "blatant suggestiveness" of the lineup
procedure which was ruled to be admissible in Ramirez, in which a witness was
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informed that a suspect matching the description had been found, and then was asked to
identify defendant while he was handcuffed alone to a chain link fence and surrounded
by police. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777.
In addition, prior to the photograph identification of defendant, the witnesses had
all been shown multiple photograph arrays and one in-person lineup. As defendant's
counsel observed, "it would be hard for the police to have been suggestive when they
have shown them 18 pictures prior to this" (R.521:24). There is certainly nothing in
the record to suggest that the photograph identification procedure was "something so
distorted or tainted that in fairness and justness the guilt or innocence of an accused
should not be allowed to be tested thereby." State v. Bruce 779 P.2d 646, 651 (Utah
1989) {quoting State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1972).3

3

Defendant also argues that the eyewitnesses' in-court identifications of him
were "tainted" by the alleged viewing of defendant by some unspecified witness or
witnesses at the preliminary hearing. Brief of Appellant, p. 27-28. However, no one
objected to the in-court identifications, and defendant does not argue that counsel's
failure to object constituted deficient performance or that allowing the in-court
identifications was clear error by the trial court. Defendant's entirely unsupported
factual assertion that an unknown witness's in-court identification was tainted is entirely
irrelevant to the issue of whether counsel was deficient in failing to file a pretrial
Ramirez motion.
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POINT II
COUNSEL'S CONCURRENCE WITH DEFENDANT'S DECISION
NOT TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL DID NOT CONSTITUTE
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
In its Rule 23B findings of fact, the trial court found that from the beginning,
defendant "told [his attorney] that he would not accept a plea bargain, that he wanted to
go to trial, and that he would not testify." The trial court further found that, because of
defendant's decision, his attorney spent little time discussing the matter. Defendant's
counsel determined that it would be better for defendant not to testify, and defendant
agreed with counsel's advice (R.516-17). At the time of trial, defendant acknowledged
on the record that he did not want to testify (R.517).
Defendant now argues that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance in
advising him of the advantages and disadvantages of testifying. However, in making
this argument, defendant fails to meet his burden of showing that counsel's advice not
to testify was so faulty as to fall outside of "the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542. Further, defendant has failed to show that he
was prejudiced by his counsel's advice.
A, Counsel's advice not to testify was well-founded.
Trial counsel did advise defendant not to testify (R.521:43). In the Rule 23B
hearing, counsel testified that he based this advice on two grounds: (1) he had come to
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the conclusion that defendant was, in fact, guilty; and (2) he anticipated that defendant
would be impeached with prior convictions.
Defendant now asserts that counsel's "unwarranted assumption" of guilt was an
improper basis for advising defendant not to testify. Brief of Appellant, p.33. Far from
being an "unwarranted assumption," counsel's conclusion that defendant was guilty
was virtually unavoidable: aside from the unchallenged and consistent eyewitness
testimony, counsel was also aware that defendant and Mr. Meacham had been either
convicted or accused of a number of similar robberies. Most importantly, defendant
himself never told his counsel that he was innocent (R.531:45). Defendant now asserts
that his counsel's belief that defendant was guilty somehow "breached his duty of
loyalty to his client." Brief of Appellant, p. 32. However, defendant does not cite to
any rule requiring a defense attorney to believe in the factual innocence of his client.
On the contrary, a trial attorney who treats a factually guilty client differently than a
factually innocent one is grounding his strategy in reality rather than legal fiction.
Defendant ignores the obvious implications of his attorney's conclusion that
defendant was guilty. Aside from the ethical problems of an attorney advising a client
to testify when he believes that the client will commit perjury, if counsel believes that
his client is guilty and the client has not offered any reasonable explanation or defense,
it is reasonable to conclude that the client will not be able to offer any such explanation
or defense if he takes the stand, and will not make a very good witness. See Rule 23B
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Hearing Transcript, p. 46 (R.521:46) ("He had nothing to offer. He had nothing to say
that would help his case."). Indeed, defendant himself acknowledged that if he had
testified he would have had nothing to offer other than a vague denial. "All I could
have said was that I didn't do it. I wasn't there. To the best of my knowledge I have
never attended a movie theater in Layton or Davis County" (R.521:69).
Counsel also testified that a second reason for advising defendant not to testify
was the fact that defendant had prior convictions which might be brought out on crossexamination. Without any analysis, defendant asserts that counsel's conclusion on this
issue was wrong, and that any prior convictions would have been excluded by the trial
court, citing State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). However, under Banner and
Rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, the use of prior convictions in cross
examination of a defendant is evaluated by conducting a balancing test, weighing the
probative value of the evidence against possible prejudice. Defendant has not
undertaken any such analysis in his brief, nor has he made a record of what prior
convictions defendant had. Consequently, defendant has not provided any basis for this
Court to evaluate this issue.
Finally, prior convictions are not the only basis for cross-examination. By
testifying, defendant would subject himself to questions and rebuttal testimony
regarding any number of issues which would harm his case, including any alibi or
explanation he offered in testifying. Perhaps most damagingly, by simple questioning
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of defendant regarding his relationship with Mecham, the prosecution would have been
able to make defendant's misidentification defense even less likely: defendant would
then have had to show not only that the witnesses misidentified him, but that they
actually misidentified one pair of associates for another similar-looking pair, while still
identifying them in separate arrays.
Accordingly, counsel's agreement with defendant's decision not to testify was
reasonable: defendant had no exculpatory evidence to offer, and would have faced cross
examination which would likely have significantly strengthened the prosecution's case.
B. Counsel's advice did not affect defendant's prior decision not to
testify, and did not prejudice defendant.
Under Strickland, defendant has the burden of showing that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, defendant must show (1) that he would have
testified, and (2) that his testimony would likely have affected the outcome of his trial.
See State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). Defendant fails to cite a factual
basis for a finding that either of these would have occurred.
Defendant asserts in his brief that he "probably" would have testified if his
counsel had properly advised him regarding his right to testify and had informed him
that his prior convictions could not have been used in cross-examination. Brief of
Appellant, p. 33. Significantly, however, the trial court did not find that defendant
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would have testified under those circumstances; the only finding regarding defendant's
intent is that defendant early on decided not to testify. R.516-517.
In addition, even defendant's ambiguous assertion that he "probably" would
have testified if told that his prior convictions would not be brought out on crossexamination is not supported by the evidence which defendant cites. See Brief of
Appellant, p.34. Defendant testified only that "I still would have, you know, taken the
chance I guess and got up there and said what he wanted me to tell them." R.521:69.
Defendant does not, therefore, assert that he would have testified but for his counsel's
allegedly erroneous analysis of the likelihood that the prosecution would have been able
to impeach him with his prior convictions. Rather, defendant testified only that he
possibly ("I guess") would have testified if his counsel told him to do so. Even if
counsel had concluded that defendant's prior convictions could not be used in cross
examination, there is no basis for finding that counsel would then have advised
defendant to testify; there were other significant reasons for advising defendant not to
testify. See Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441 (lack of evidence to show that defendant would
have decided to testify in the absence of counsel's allegedly bad advice).
Finally, defendant does not make any reasonable showing that his testimony
would have altered the outcome of the trial. The evidence against defendant was
substantial and essentially unchallenged. If defendant had testified, there is no reason
to believe that he would have helped his case, as indicated in the analysis above
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regarding the soundness of counsel's advice not to testify. See supra, Point II.A.
Defendant himself stated at the Rule 23B hearing that if he had testified, "[a] 111 could
have said was that I didn't do it." R.521:69. Such testimony is hardly likely to have
undercut the evidence presented by the prosecution, and would only have served to
emphasize to the jury the total lack of any rebuttal to that evidence. See State v.
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (defendant failed to show that his proposed
testimony would have altered the verdict); Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441-42 ("Proof of
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a
demonstrable reality.") (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)).
Accordingly, defendant has failed to show either that he would have testified if
counsel had advised him differently concerning use of his prior convictions or that his
vague denial of guilt would have altered the outcome of the trial.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT
REQUESTING AN INSTRUCTION ON A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE SINCE SUCH AN INSTRUCTION WOULD HAVE BEEN
IMPROPER AS HAVING NO FACTUAL BASIS, AND WOULD
HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH THE THEORY OF THE
DEFENSE
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury
instruction on the lesser included offense of unlawful restraint. Brief of Appellant,
p.34. As defendant points out, the offense of unlawful restraint, Utah Code Ann. § 76-

24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5-304 (1995), is committed whenever a defendant "knowingly restrains another
unlawfully." Such "restraint" is necessarily included in the crime of aggravated
kidnaping, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995), which is committed (as applied to this
case) when the victim is seized, confined, detained, or transported in order to facilitate
the commission of a felony. Defendant reasons that, since the elements of aggravated
kidnaping necessarily include the elements of unlawful restraint, he was entitled to a
lesser included instruction on unlawful restraint.
This argument fails because the fact that unlawful restraint is a lesser included
offense of aggravated kidnapping does not without more entitle defendant to a lesser
included instruction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1995) provides that:
The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included
offense.
See also State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924 (Utah App. 1998) (request for a lesser included
instruction should be granted only if "a rational basis exists on which the jury could
acquit the defendant of the offense charged while convicting him of the alternative
offense.") (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)).
Accordingly, an instruction on the lesser included offense would not be
mandated unless there was a reasonable basis for a jury to acquit defendant of the
greater offense of aggravated kidnaping but convict him of the lesser offense of
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unlawful restraint. Under the facts of this case, there was no reasonable basis for such
a verdict. Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to defendant, the
unlawful restraint proven at trial unquestionably occurred to facilitate a robbery. No
reasonable interpretation of the evidence would support a finding that defendant
"restrained" the theater employees, and yet did not do so in furtherance of the robbery.
In addition, regardless of the legal availability of a lesser included instruction,
defendant's counsel would have had a valid tactical reason not to request it: the
instruction would have conflicted with defendant's own theory of the case, which was
misidentification, not lack of intent to commit a robbery. See State v. Hall, 946 P.2d
712, 723 (Utah App. 1997) (failure to request a lesser included instruction was not
ineffective assistance because the instruction would have been inconsistent with trial
strategy); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) (defendant received
effective assistance because jury instruction on lesser crime "would have been wholly
'incompatible'" with trial strategy, which relied on the defense of misidentification).
Finally, even if a lesser included instruction on unlawful restraint was
appropriate and tactically desirable, defendant has the burden of showing that the
verdict would have been different if the instruction had been given. State v. Payne, 964
P.2d 327, 334 (Utah App. 1998) (no error if "the evidence of the greater offense was so
strong that there is no substantial likelihood of a different outcome had the requested
instruction been given."). Defendant has made no effort to do so here.
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Accordingly, counsel did not render ineffective assistance in deciding not to
request an instruction on unlawful restraint, and defendant has failed to show that he
was prejudiced by his counsel's judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ££_ day of November, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

SCOTT KEITH WILSON
Assistant Attorney General
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76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping.

" * ^ n

hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel

in particular conduct; or
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political
function; or
(e) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter,
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit
if the victim is mentally incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the
victim's custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the
victim.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term
which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5,10, or 15 years and
which may be for life,
History: C. 1953, 76-5-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-302; 1974, ch. 32, § 12;
1983, ch. 88, § 15.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Sentence.

Sentence 0111 ^ 4 0^nSeS'
^Constitutionality.
TjnhplH
Cited
Lesser included offenses.
Defendant charged with aggravated kidnaping was entitled to a jury instruction on assault
as a lesser included offense since there was
sufficient overlap in elements of two offenses
and if jury had accepted defendant's version of
evidence, however unlikely that might have
been, it could have voted to acquit him of
aggravated kidnaping and to convict him of
assault. State v. Brown, 694 R2d 587 (Utah
1984).

-Constitutionality.
T h e ag avated kidna in
f
P S minimum mandaA
or
* y sentencing provision is constitutional.
S t a t e v Russell
'
> 791 R 2 d 188 (Utah 1990)
—Upheld.
Concurrent 15-year minimum mandatory
sentences for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault found not cruel and
unusual punishment. See State v. Russell, 791
p.2d 188 (Utah 1990).
Cited in State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621
(Utah 1987); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987
(Utah 1989); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Kidnapping § 1.
A.L.R. — What is "harm" within provisions

of statutes increasing penalty for kidnaping
where victim suffers harm, 11 A.L.R.3d 1053.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

76-5-304. Unlawful detention.
(1) A person commits unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains another
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.
(2) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-304, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-304.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

offense of kidnaping a minor, § 76-5-301. State
v. Cross, 649 R2d 72 (Utah 1982).

Elements.
uibttit^l*
C'ted

e^ce°officer
'

Elements.
For cases discussing definition and elements
of former offense of false imprisonment, see
Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P. 653,1912B
Ann. Cas. 1366 (1910); Mildon v. Bybee, 13
Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962).
Kidnaping a minor.
Unlawful detention is not a lesser included

Liability of peace officer.
^ peace officer would not necessarily be held
liable for mistaking identity of person named in
warrant of arrest if he had exercised reasonable
diligence and care in ascertaining identity before he served warrant. Mildon v. Bybee, 13
Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962).
C i t e d in State v

1991).

- James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Imprisonment § 151.
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 71.
A.L.R. — Excessiveness or inadequacy of
compensatory damages for false imprisonment

or arrest, 48 A.L.R.4th 165.
Penalties for common-law criminal offense of
false imprisonment, 67 A.L.R.4th 1103.
Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment «=»
43.
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